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358166bc12
1. The things we're really trying to protect - contact identities, message contents, etc - can't be erased from memory because they're encapsulated inside objects we don't control. 2. Long-term secrets can't be protected by erasing them from memory because they're stored in the database and the database key has to be held in memory whenever the app's running. 3. If the runtime uses a compacting garbage collector then we have no way to ensure an object is erased from memory. 4. Trying to erase secrets from memory makes the code more complex. Conclusion: Let's not try to protect secrets from an attacker who can read arbitrary memory locations.
22 lines
743 B
Java
22 lines
743 B
Java
package org.briarproject.api.crypto;
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import org.briarproject.api.ContactId;
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import org.briarproject.api.TransportId;
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import org.briarproject.api.lifecycle.Service;
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import org.briarproject.api.transport.Endpoint;
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import org.briarproject.api.transport.StreamContext;
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public interface KeyManager extends Service {
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/**
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* Returns a {@link org.briarproject.api.transport.StreamContext
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* StreamContext} for sending data to the given contact over the given
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* transport, or null if an error occurs or the contact does not support
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* the transport.
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*/
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StreamContext getStreamContext(ContactId c, TransportId t);
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/** Called whenever an endpoint has been added. */
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void endpointAdded(Endpoint ep, int maxLatency, byte[] initialSecret);
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}
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